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1. INTRODUCTION
Rapid progress of Information, Communication Tech-
nology (ICT) has been contributing to the technical im-
provement of design, operation and maintenance of nuclear
power plants in general and especially in the advancement
of instrumentation and control (I&C) systems and human-
machine interface technologies (HMIT). But on the other
hand of various merits of technical improvement by ICT,
the complexities and multiple functionalities brought by
the extensive computer application for the nuclear I&C
and HMIT have made it more difficult than before in the
safety evaluation to the introduced systems in the actual
plants.
In Japan, where light water reactor technologies had
been introduced from the US in late 1960s, the development
of full digital I&C and HMIT systems had been initiated
in the 80’s-90’s for both PWR and BWR plants by the
collaboration of all nuclear power utilities and nuclear
power plant vendors with the governmental support of
Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI).
The first introduction of full digitalized I&C and main
control room (MCR) was for the first Advanced Boiling
Water Reactor (ABWR) plant Kashiwazaki-Kariwa No.
6 unit of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) which
started commercial operation in 1996, while for PWR
Tomari No.3 unit of Hokkaido Electric Power Company
was the first fully digitalized I&C and MCR in commercial
operation in 2009.  
During the process of introducing full digital I&C and
HMIT systems for both PWR and BWR plants constructed
in Japan, the technical guidelines for full digital I&C and
HMIT systems had been gradually set up by the Japan
Electric Association (JEA) as the several domestic industrial
standards in Japan, which are not only consistent with basic
principles on nuclear safety in the world and the related
international standards but also comply with national laws
for nuclear, guidelines issued by Nuclear Safety Commis-
sion, ministerial orders by Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Agency (NISA). Those industrial standards by the JEA
had been utilized for the designing of the computerized
MCRs for several newly constructed nuclear power plants
and the replacement of old analog-type MCRs to digitalized
MCRs in Japan.
It has been historically inevitable in Japan to have
frequent large-scale earthquakes with sometimes accom-
A comprehensive review on the technical standards about human factors (HF) design and software reliability
maintenance for digital instrumentation and control (I&C) and human-machine interface technology (HMIT) in Japanese
light water reactor nuclear power plants (NPPs) was given in this paper mainly by introducing the relevant activities at the
Japan Electric Association to set up many industrial standards within the traditional framework of nuclear safety regulation
in Japan. 
In Japan, the Fukushima Daiichi accident that occurred on March 11, 2011 has great impact on nuclear regulation and
nuclear industries where concerns by the general public about safety have heightened significantly. However for the part of
HF design and software reliability maintenance of digital I&C and HMIT for NPP, the author believes that the past practice
of Japanese activities with the related technical standards can be successfully inherited in the future, by reinforcing the
technical preparedness for the prevention and mitigation against any types of severe accident occurrence.
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panying high tides called tsunami. In July 2009, TEPCO’s
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station (seven units)
where the both units 6 and 7 are full digital MCR ABWR
plants, had been hit by Chu-etsu-oki earthquake (magni-
tude 6.8). In March 2011, TEPCO’s Fukiushima Daiichi,
and Fukushima nuclear power stations (ten units), Tohoku
Electric Power Company’s Onagawa and Higashi-Dori
nuclear power stations (four units) and Japan Atomic Power
Company’s Tokai Daini nuclear power station (one unit)
were all hit by Higashi-Nihon earthquake (magnitude 9)
with the highest tsunamis afterwards bringing severe
accidents at four units of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power station. There were no full digital MCR plants among
fifteen units hit by the Higashi-Nihon earthquake in 2011.
The effect of the severe accident at Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power station was so enormous that the traditional
framework of nuclear power regulation had to be totally
altered in Japan. In September 2012, major governmental
institutions of nuclear regulation, i.e., nuclear safety com-
mission in Cabinet Office and NISA in MITI, were abol-
ished to be integrated into a new institution called Nuclear
Regulation Agency (NRA) with the nomination of six
commissioners for the also newborn Nuclear Regulatory
Committee which has power to decide on nuclear regulation
independent from cabinet control. Recently, the NRA has
been busy revising almost all legitimate institutions and
guidelines related with national regulation on nuclear safety
with a completion deadline of July 2013 by reflecting on
all lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident,
which includes several important issues on I&C and HMIT
for nuclear power stations as well as for several facilities
related with nuclear emergency response.
In this paper, the comprehensive review will be made
on the industrial standards for HF design and software
reliability maintenance of digital I&C and HMIT for NPP
which was established by the JEA and has been widely
used in Japan as the standard method for introducing
digitalized MCRs in nuclear power plants. In which follows,
basic principles of nuclear safety with specific issues for
nuclear I&C and HMIT will be introduced in Chapter 2,
a brief history of introducing digital I&C and HMIT in
Japan in Chapter 3, technical standard setup activities at
the Japan Electric Association in Chapter 4, summarized
contents of JEA’s standards for human factors design and
software reliability of digital I&C and HMIT in Chapter
5, and the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accident to
nuclear I&C and HMIT in Japan in Chapter 6 before the
concluding remarks of this paper.
2. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR SAFETY
ISSUES OF NUCLEAR I&C AND HMIT
According to G. Petrangelli in his book titled “Nuclear
Safety” [1], he pointed out eight basic principles of nuclear
safety as listed in Table 1.
Among the eight principles in Table 1, the fifth principle
of defense-in depth provision is considered as the specific
characteristic of a nuclear safety system: There are four
barriers of (i) fuel matrix, (ii)fuel cladding, (iii)reactor
cooling circuit pressure boundary, and (iv)containment
system in order to primarily prevent external release of
radiological products which should be normally contained
in the nuclear reactor and secondarily to mitigate the effect
of radiological release in the event of nuclear accident. For
this purpose, it is necessary to configure five levels of
defense as illustrated in Table 2. And with regards to the
digital I&C and HMIT as the subject of this paper, it should
primarily concern with the levels 2 and 3 in Table 2. 
There are two difficult issues for ensuring nuclear
safety until the third level in Table 2.The first is the con-
sideration of common cause failure [2] which should take
into account not only internal causes by design, fabrication
and maintenance of nuclear power plant but also external
causes such as natural disasters, fires, airplane corrosion,
etc, as described in Fig.1. You can see from Fig.1 that the
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Table 1. Eight Technical Principles for Nuclear Safety
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Adoption of proven engineering solution.
High quality of engineering applied to all aspects of the design, construction and operation.
Adequate quality assurance measures proportionate to the safety classification and qualification of structures, systems and
components.
Safety analysis including its verification.
Defense-in depth provisions against common cause faults such as diversity, physical separation and barriers both for internal
and external events.
Good practice of operation and maintenance including the provisions for the use of the lessons learned from past experience.
Safety culture and attention to human factors.
Provisions to ensure the documented adequacy of the operation organization and the independent role of he regulatory control
bodies.
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external causes will affect broader areas, systems and
components than internal causes for the safety of nuclear
power plants. The second one is what is called human
factors or human error. Figure 2 shows the classification
of human error mechanism which the author of this paper
modified a bit from the original scheme by J. Reason [3]
by classifying further whether or not the committed person
has the intention to do so. Such human factors are also
common cause factors as already appear in Fig.1, but
from the point of designing I&C and HMIT the normal
consideration will be given on human cognitive factors
as highlighted in Fig.2. 
Table 2. Five Defense Levels of Nuclear Safety
Defense level Objective Essential means
Level 1 Prevention of abnormal operations and of malfunctions
Conservative design and high quality of construction and
operation
Level 2 Control of abnormal operation and detection of
malfunction
Control, limitation and protection systems and other
surveillance characteristics
Level 3 Control of accidents included in the design basis Engineered safety systems and accident procedures
Level 5 Mitigation of the radiological consequences of
significant releases of radioactive products
External site emergency plan
Level 4
Control of the severe accident conditions of the plant,
including the prevention of accident and mitigation of
consequences
Additional measures and accident management
Fig. 1. Consideration on Common Mode Failure
Fig. 2. Human Error to be Considered in Nuclear Safety
According to G. Petrangelli[1], he also pointed out
three specific considerations for I& C and HMIT as listed
in Table 3. In considering digital I&C and HMIT, more
attention has been given to items 1 and 2 of Table 3 in
the past: For item1 as the human factors consideration to
prevent operator error in MCR, while for item 2 common
cause countermeasures in the event of system down of
computers for HMIT. However the item 3 of Table 3
pointed out the provisions against all loss of electric power
to the MCR. In fact, the effect of tsunami attacking the
whole plant after a large earthquake was an important factor
in the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
3. BRIEF HISTORY OF INTRODUCING DIGITAL I&C
AND HMIT IN JAPAN
Nuclear power development had been initiated in the
latter half of the 1960s by introducing US light water
reactor technologies (both PWR and BWR). Construction
of nuclear power plants had been accelerated by experi-
encing oil shocks twice in the 70s, with expanding the
domestication of nuclear power technologies until the 80s
when traditional analog I&C and MCR from the US had
been improved by more automation by digital technologies
and the introduction of CRTs in the MCR which is called
as hybrid MCR. 
By reflecting the technical progress of computers in
the 90s, automation and communication technologies had
prevailed in many industries around the period. In Japan,
a national project of developing new light water reactors,
advanced PWR (APWR) and advanced BWR (ABWR),
had been conducted by the cooperation of nuclear utilities
and nuclear power vendors with governmental support
through MITI, where the realization of full digital I&C
and MCR was one of the big technical challenges at that
time to improve various human factors problems of MCR
as revealed in the TMI-2 accident in 1979 and Chernobyl
accident in 1986. Concretely, the technical targets of
improving human factors at MCR by full digital I&C and
HMIT are shown in Table 4. 
The appearance of full digital MCR of TEPCO’s
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 is shown in Fig. 3. This is
the first ABWR which had started commercial operation
in 1996.
There have been four ABWRs (Kashiwazaki-Kariha
unit 6 and 7, Hamaoka Unit 5, and Shika Unit 2) already
in operation and two units under construction (Shimane
Unit 3 and Ohma plant) in Japan. 
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Table 3. Three Specific Considerations for NPIC + HMIT
1
Design provisions intended to give operators enough time to respond to event and to ensure adequate man-machine interface
including operator-support means intended to facilitate their task.
2
Where a microprocessor-based reactor protection system is used, the presence of a backup system of traditional type or other
means to ensure protection against malfunctions, included those involving the software is assured.
3
Presence of emergency electric power supply sources including portable ones, but different from the traditional emergency
sources, either by type of machine and by type of fuel.
Table 4. Technical Targets of Full Digital I&C + HMIT in Japanese PWR and BWR
Information sharing (improvement of communication ability)
Reduction of workload
Reduction of human errors
Amenity
Large display panel
Compact operation console 
Touch operation by flat displays
Expansion of automation range
Windows, illumination and living rooms for the comfort of operators
Objectives by human factors aspect Technical means
Fig. 3. Full Digitalized Main Control Room for Japanese
ABWR
Conversely, the construction of the first APWR plant
in Tsuruga in Japan has been delayed by various political
reasons. Therefore the full digital I&C and HMIT for
conventional PWR was realized at Tomari Unit 3 of the
Hokkaido Electric Power Company. The Tomari Unit 3
started its commercial operation in 2009. The apperance
of full digital MCR of Tomari Unit 3 is shown in Fig.4. 
The replacement of old analog I&C and HMIT of
conventional PWR plants by full digital I&C and HMIT had
been also conducted by Ikata Unit 1 and 2 of the Shikoku
Electric Power Company in 2009. 
The history of introducing full digital I&C and HMIT
in Japan is summarized in Table 5, where also shown is
the statistics of the number of unplanned shutdowns by
failure of a full digital system. There were 19 unplanned
shutdowns for seven nuclear power plants which employ
full digital I&C and HMIT system, but there were no failure
of full digital system. At present all seven nuclear power
plants in Table 5 were forced into a shutdown state due to
safety concerns in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi
incident in March 2011
4. TRADITIONAL TECHNICAL STANDARD SETUP
ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN
In this chapter, the relationship between nuclear regula-
tion and industrial standards in Japan will be first explained
before detailing the current efforts of the Japan Electric
Association to set up industrial standards for Japanese
nuclear industries.
4.1 Hierarchy of Nuclear Standards in Japan
Nuclear power facilities are not only electric facilities
but are also responsible for protecting employees and the
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Fig. 4. Full Digitalized Main Control Room for Japanese PWR
Table 5. History of Introducing Full Digital I&C+HMIT in Japan
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011 - 2012
Total
0
0
2
2
1
1
1
0
1
0
2
2
2
4
1
0
19
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
4
4
4
4
7
7
7
7
Kashiwazaki-Kariha-6
Kashiwazaki-Kariha-7
Hamaoka-5
Shika-2
Tomari-3   Ikata-1,2 (replace)
All plant shutdown after Fukushima Daiichi accident
Year Unplanned
shutdown
Reactor scram ECCS start
No of full
digital systems
Note
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general public from radioactive exposure. Therefore, the
safety of nuclear facilities was regulated in Japan by several
laws and orders by different ministerial organizations:
electric business act by Ministry of Economy, Trading and
Industry (METI), various laws and orders by Nuclear
Safety Commission and Ministry of Education, Science
and Technology (MEXT), etc, depending upon the specific
issues and facilities involved. In addition, it has been
normally submitted from the governmental divisions to the
disposal of individual industries to decide the technical
details to meet the objectives set by laws and ministerial
orders. This is the reason why there exist so many technical
standards which are set up by various academic societies
and industrial associations not only domestically but also
internationally. Figure 5 shows the relationship between
nuclear regulation by national laws and industrial standards
set up by public institutions in Japan by classifying four
levels of hierarchy in nuclear regulation, that is, objective,
functional requirement, performance requirement and
permissible execution method. 
In Fig. 5, the correspondence is indicated between the
technical criteria (which is described in the Ministerial
order No.62 issued by METI based on Electric Business
Act) and the industrial standard set by the Japan Electric
Association (JEA). The JEA considers the safety measures
of nuclear power plants as one of the electric facilities
which are regulated by Electric Business Act in the follow-
ing ways: (i)Conformity to technical standards given in
Electricity Business Act is the minimum requirement on
performance for construction, maintenance and operation,
(ii)Independent safety measures should be taken by the
facility operators, and (iii)Industrial standards to describe
the technical details on materials, design, fabrication,
testing, quality assurance, etc., should be set by industrial
societies and associations, through a socially open, fair
and justified process.
There are many academic societies and technical
associations which are contributing to setting up various
industrial standards in response to the operators of various
electric facilities, and for the nuclear power generating
facilities. Among them, Atomic Energy Society of Japan,
Japan Mechanical Society and Japan Electric Association
are major institutions to set up various industrial standards
based on their respective expertise. 
4.2 Industrial Standards Setup Activity at the Japan
Electric Association
There are two kinds of industrial standards by the
Japan Electric Association: (i) Code indicated as JEAC-
XXXX which describes the definitions, means, specifi-
cations, methods, procedures, etc., definitely and explicitly
as requirement, and (ii) Guide indicated as JEAG-XXXX
which recommends plausible or alternative ways to imple-
ment the requirement within the present stage of technical
knowledge. As to the relationship with the hierarchy of
national regulation as shown in Fig.5, there are many codes
and guides by JEA which are endorsed by METI. Those
codes and guides endorsed by METI are interpreted to
clearly exhibit the methods of executing the technical criteria
given by the METI’s order.
At JEA, the Japan Electrotechnical Standards and
Codes Committee has been generally in charge of setting
up various industrial standards for various electric facilities,
while the Nuclear Standards Committee of JEA has been
responsible for those of nuclear power facilities from the
special aspect of nuclear power facilities. As seen from
Fig. 6 of the configuration of Nuclear Standards Committee
of JEA, there are seven subcommittees to set up industrial
standards for safety design, structure, nuclear fuels, quality
assurance, anti-seismic design, radiation management, and
operation and maintenance for nuclear power facilities.
Fig. 5. Technical Criteria and Industrial Standards in the
Hierarchy of Nuclear Safety Regulation in Japan
Fig. 6. Composition of Nuclear Standards Committee of the
Japan Electric Association
The author of this paper has previously contributed as the
chair of Safety design subcommittee for ten years between
2002 and 2011, and all the codes and guides of JEA which
the author of this paper committed to set up and update
during the period are listed in Table 6. 
All the codes and guides in Table 6 are classified into
four categories of (i) Definition of classification and de-
signing safety grade electrical and mechanical equipments,
(ii) General safety provision of plant facilities, (iii) Safety
protection system, and (iv) Main control room, with the ID
number and the full names of individual standards. The
contents of all standards are described by Japanese. Indi-
vidual standards can be available from JEA upon request.
The essential points of two standards, JEAG 4621-2007
(Guide on evaluating instrument drift of safety protection
system) and JEAG 4617-2005 (Guide on development and
design of computerized human interface of main control
room), are published in English as the journal papers[4,5].
5. HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN AND SOFTWARE
RELIABILITY OF DIGITAL I&C AND HMIT IN
JAPAN
Adoption of full digital I&C and HMIT for nuclear
power plants has nowadays become a common trend
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Table 6. Codes and Guidelines for Safety Design of Nuclear Power Plants Established by the Japan Electric Association
Class ID No. Names of codes and standards
Definition of classification
and designing safety grade
electrical and mechanical
equipments 
General safety provision
of plant facilities
Safety protection system
Main control room
JEAC
4602-2004
Code on defining the range of reactor coolant pressure boundary and reactor containment
JEAC
4605-2004
Code on defining the range of engineered safety facilities of nuclear power plant and the
related facilities
JEAG
4612-2010
Guide on classifying the importance of electrical and mechanical equipments of safety
functions
JEAC
4603-2010
Code on designing electric power supplies important for safety
JEAG
4611-2009
Guide on designing instrumentation and control systems of safety functions
JEAG
4623-2008
Guide on verifying anti-environmental performance of instrumentation and control systems
of safety functions
JEAG
4608-2007
JEAC
4626-2010
JEAG
4607-2010
JEAG
4627-2010
Guide on anti-thunder designing of nuclear power plants
Code on fire protection design of nuclear power plants
Guide on fire protection design of nuclear power plants
Guide on designing emergency response facility of nuclear power plants
JEAC
4604-2009
Code on designing safety protection system
JEAC
4620-2008
Code on applying digital computer for safety protection system
JEAG
4609-2008
Guide on verification and validation of digital safety protection system
JEAG
4621-2007
Guide on evaluating instrument drift of safety protection system
JEAC
4624-2009
Code on designing to prevent operation error in main control room
JEAG
4617-2005
Guide on development and design of computerized human interface of main control room
JEAC
4622-2009
Code on operators’ radiation protection in accident condition of main control room
around the nuclear developing countries, where it seems
to become a hot topic of discussion around many countries
as to the methodological developments to introduce full
digital I&C and HMIT. They are (i)software reliability
evaluation of computerized reactor protection system, and
(ii) evaluation of the adaptability of full digital MCR to
the operators. 
The solutions to the above questions had been imple-
mented in Japan during the development and implementing
process of full digital I&C and HMIT for both PWR and
BWR, by introducing the corresponding industrial standards
for the both of them, as the combinations of code and guide
established by the Japan Electric Association as listed in
Table 7 for (a)Software V&V for Digital Safety System
and (b) Human Factors Design of Main Control Room,
which are consistent with the hierarchy of national nuclear
regulation as already shown in Fig. 5. Concerning the
configuration of full computerized MCR, it is assumed to
equip with such human interface facilities by such arrange-
ment in a typical control room as is shown in Fig. 7.
Concerning (a)Software V&V for Digital Safety System,
functional requirements for digitalized reactor protection
system are summarily listed up in Code on applying digital
computer for safety protection system (JEAC4620-2008).
This corresponds to the requirement for the reliability of
reactor safety protection system in the guideline of safety
design of light water reactors given by the nuclear safety
commission. The detailed methodologies to realize the
designing of the target safety protection system and the
procedures to prove the designed system are formulated
as Guide on verification and validation of digital safety
protection system (JEAG4609-2008).
Concerning (b) Human Factors Design of Main Control
Room, the guideline of safety design of light water reactors
given by the nuclear safety commission requires that the
designing of MCRs should prevent the operators’ error
be the MCRs analog or digital. This general requirement
statement is described in details as Code on equipment
designing to prevent operation error in the main control
room (JEAC 4624-2009). The detailed methods of devel-
oping the standard design of digital MCR, validating the
standard MCR design, and applying the standard design
for introducing into real plant to meet its real objective
and restriction are described in Guide on development
and design of computerized human interface of the main
control room (JEAG4617-2005). 
In order for the operators to operate the plant rightly
without error, it is necessary that the operators should
master a certain level of relevant knowledge and skills
for nuclear power plant operation with a certain amount
of job experience. Although it is outside of this paper,
there is the relevant standards to specifying the method
of operators’ education and training established by the
Operation and maintenance Subcommittee of Nuclear
Standards Committee of the Japan Electric Association. 
The more detailed contents of the Codes and Guides for
both (a) and (b), are described in 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
It will then be briefly explained in 5.3 how the digital
computer application for I&C and HMIT for nuclear power
plants has been made in Japan.
5.1 Software V&V for Digital Safety System
5.1.1Code on Applying Digital Computer for Safety
Protection System (JEAC4620-2008)
The code JEAC4620-2008 describes the functional
requirements for the digitalized safety protection system
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Table 7. Logical Order of Industrial Standard for HF Design and Software V&V of Digital I&C+HMIT 
Code
Guide
Code
Guide
Code on applying digital computer for safety protection system
Guide on verification and validation of digital safety protection system
Human Factors Design of Main Control Room
Code on equipment designing to prevent operation error in main control room
Guide on development and design of computerized human interface of main control room
Software V&V for Digital Safety System
Fig. 7. An Example Configuration of Computerized Human-
machine Interface for Monitoring and Operation
as listed in Table 8. It requires that the system should be
equipped with the protective functions both against
malfunction in the event of troubles and false activation
during normal operation with high reliability. It also
describes eighteen items of functional requirements.
Among those eighteen items not only it includes redun-
dancy, independency, physical separation from normal
I&C system, etc., which are common to a conventional
analog-type safety protection system, but also it requires
several features specific to digital system such as self-
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Table 8. Code on Applying Digital Computer for Safety Protection System  
ID Subject Content
1.
1.1
Requirement 
Functions in  the event of
transients, accidents and
earthquakes
Attain high reliability by considering both unavailability and malfunction rate. The following
requirement items must be satisfied.
Both reactor shutdown system and engineered safety system should initiate automatically  in the
event of those situations.
1.2 Accuracy and responsetime
Digital safety protection system should satisfy both conditions of accuracy and response time as
a whole system composed by computer and the related hardware.
1.3 Redundancy Redundant configuration should be taken so that it does not lose intended functions againstsingle fault or single takeoff or bypass.
1.4 Independency Independency of each channel is taken by electrical and physical separation between channelsso that it does not lose its function by a single channel failure.
1.5
Separation from
instrument and control
system
Even in case of partial sharing between the both, electrical separation should be considered.
Also functional separation is taken when communication is shared.
1.6 Function in case of failure Fail safe state should be attained in case of unfavorable situation such as loss of driving power,etc.
1.7 Testability Maintenance of soundness and redundancy should be confirmed by testing even during poweroperation.
1.8 Environmental condition Anti-seismic, anti-surge and the other anti-hazardous characteristics are considered.
1.9 Use of emergency powersource
Electric power source of digital safety protection system should be supplied by emergency in-
station power system so that electric power can be supplied even in case of loss of external
power or loss of all AC power.
1.10 Parameter value change Parameter values of the digital protection system can be manually changed.
1.11 Selection of input variables As many as practically available, input variables of the digital protection system should be thecorresponding directly measurable signals.
1.12
1.13
Completeness of protect
action
Manual operation
Once started, the protect action of the protection system should be continued until its
completion.
If necessary, reactor shutdown system or engineered safety system can be operated manually. 
1.14 Display of activation andbypass
When the protection system is activated, the cause should be displayed on the main control
board. Also the state of bypass or out of inline of the system equipment or channel should be
continuously displayed on the board.
1.15 Self diagnosis function Self diagnosis can be made independently for each channel by appropriate period of time, withthe result being  announced to the operator when anomalies are detected, 
1.16 Cutoff of external network External effect should be prevented by cutting off external network.
1.17
Protection measure against
unplanned  software
alteration 
Appropriate protective measures are taken against unplanned  software alteration to the software
system installed on the digital protection system.
1.18 Quality management 
The quality of digital computers and the software system should be assured by the three QM
activities:
(i) Software life cycle management
(ii) Software configuration management
(iii) Software verification and validation  activity
2. Common cause faultmeasure
Hardware equipment should be prepared within rational range, in order to ensure further
reliability from the aspect of defense-in depth safety.
diagnostic function, countermeasures against unplanned
change of software, etc. It also requires the alternative
means as the countermeasure against all loss of functions
of digital system by common cause failures. This code
had been endorsed by NISA that it satisfies the technical
criteria requested by MITI’s ministerial order.
5.1.2 Guide on Verification and Validation of Digital
Safety Protection System (JEAG4609-2008)
This guide JEAG4609-2008 describes guidance infor-
mation on the verification and validation to the software
implemented into the digital safety protection system such
as objective, execution methods (execution procedure,
members of execution, document management and software
tools for V&V), software reutilization and software config-
uration management. 
Design and fabrication process and the V and V activity
of digital safety protection system are separately made by
different teams independently. As shown in Fig.8 for the
whole, it begins with the verification 1 to verify the design
specification of the digital safety protection system and the
fundamental plan of V and V activity. According to thus
verified hardware-software design requirement specification,
both the designing and fabrication of hardware and software
are separately conducted, and finally both hardware and
software are integrated. The sequential activities of verifi-
cation 2, 3 and 3 are made during the individual processes
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Fig. 8. Verification and Validation of Digital Safety Protection
System
Table 9. Guide on Verification and Validation of Digital Safety Protection System  
1.
2.
1.1
1.2
1.3
Software verification & validation
Objective of verification & validation ( V&V)
V & V activity is to assure that the system requirements for digital safety protection system are rightly realized in the
processes of design, fabrication, test and alteration.
The verification activity is made to check the consistency between upstream specification and downstream one in design
and fabrication processes by the following aspects.
(a) System requirement items for digital protection system are rightly reflected in hardware-hardware design requirement
specification.
(b) Software is designed and fabricated  based on the hardware-hardware design requirement specification.
(c) Software is designed so that it is able to conduct on V&V.
Validation activity is made in test process to confirm that the total system after the software is integrated into hardware
realizes rightly the system requirements for digital safety protection system.
2.1 Execution procedure and content of V&V   ( See Fig.8)
2.2 V&V team (Members should be different between those involved in design and fabrication and those involved in V&V.)
2.3 Documentation control (Both for design and fabrication and for V&V activities)
2.4 Software tool management (When software tools are used for either (i)software design, generation and testing or (ii)
software for V&V purposes, those software tools under quality management should be employed.  
Execution of V&V
3.
Software configuration management
V&V for software re-utilization
The range and justification of re-utilization should be clarified for each task of software design and generation.
1. Configuration management based on documentation for the alteration of both design requirement specification and software,
especially with the reason, place and the influenced ranges. If necessary, V&V should be made on the altered part.
2. The software identical to the one implemented in the protection system should be separately preserved.
of design and fabrication of the hardware and software in
accordance with the hardware-software design specification,
and then verification 5 is conducted at the integration stage
of hardware and software. Finally the V and V is completed
by conducting validation test.
The international IEEE Standard 1012-1998 [6] and
IEEE Standard 7-4.3.2-2003 [7] were utilized in setting
up this domestic guide JEAG4609-2008. 
5.2 Human Factors Design of Main Control Room
5.2.1 Code on Equipment Design to Prevent
Operation Error in Main Control Room (JEAC
4624-2009)
This code JEAC 4624-2009 summarizes the functional
requirements on designing the main control room applicable
for the different types of control room (analog, hybrid and
full digital). As listed in Table 10, it depends on a variety
of factors such as (i)environmental conditions and arrange-
ment of equipments in the area of the main control room
where operators monitor and operate the plant, (ii)task
allocation between human and machine, task division
between different operation members, and the way of
information share, (iii)panel layout in the main control
board, display, alarm and operation support system, and
control input equipments, and (iv)the ways of developing,
fabricating and updating. 
This code has been endorsed by NISA that it satisfies
with the technical criteria requested by METI’s ministerial
order to prevent MCR operators from committing operation
error. 
5.2.2 Guide on Development and Design of
Computerized Human Interface of Main
Control Room (JEAG4617-2005)
This guide JEAG4617-2005 gives the guidance to
realize the requirements given in the code JEAC 4624-
2009 concretely as the human interface of computerized
MCR. As shown in Table 11, the contents of this code
are (i)functional requirements, (ii)design requirements,
(iii)development process and fabrication design process,
and (iv) V&V process.  
Both the development of the standard MCR design
and the fabrication design process of the MCR of the
individual plant are illustrated in Fig. 9. The left-hand side
flow in Fig. 9 is when a digitalized MCR as shown in Fig.7
will be developed as the standard design. It starts from
the functional requirement process to reduce functional
requirement specification on the basis of both the develop-
ment objective and functional requirement, proceed to
standard design process to be made on the basis of not only
the development objective and functional requirement but
also design requirement, conduct on V&V process and
finally reduce the resultant standard design specification.
On the other hand of standard MCR design, the right-
hand flow in Fig. 9 corresponds to the fabrication design
of individual MCR in an actual plant. In this case, the
original standard design specification will not be directly
applied but modify it in accordance with the actual plant
condition and design requirement. The modified specifi-
cation will be then checked through the V and V process to
reduce the fabrication design specification to be referenced
for real fabrication of the MCR.
Both international standards of IEC 60964 [8] and
NUREG-0700 rev.2 [9] were utilized in setting up this
domestic guide JEAG4617-2005. 
5.3 Actual Introduction of Digital I&C and HMIT
System in Japanese Nuclear Power Plants
The nuclear utilities and vendors view the relation
between the codes and guides by the Japan Electric Asso-
ciation as described in both 5. 1 and 5.2 by the following
way. The codes give more clear information on the func-
tional requirements than by the regulatory requirements
for designing the facilities, systems, components and
equipments. The guides recommend useful information on
usable models, methods, procedures, etc, for designing and
fabricating the facilities, systems, components and equip-
ments in accordance with the specifications given by codes. 
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Table 10. Code on Equipment Designing to Prevent Operation Error in Main Control Room
No. Target Content
1
Monitoring and operation area, main
control room
Main control board
Comfortable environmental condition (temperature, illumination, noise)
2
Layout and work space to prevent undue workload to the operators (task
allocation between man and machine, between operators, information share, etc.)
Panel layout
Display system, alarm system, operator support system
Control functions (easy operation to prevent human error, interlocks) , visualize
state  of automatic operation
Application of verification and validation process for the development,
implementation and replacement
3
5
6
4
At this point, the author of this article would like to
summarize by what way the real introduction of digital
computers for the I&C and HMIT systems had been
conducted in the nuclear power plants in Japan from the
limited experience of the late 80s and early 90s.
5.3.1 Introduction of Digital Computers for Nuclear
I&C and HMIT by Kansai Electric Power
Company 
The Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) is the
monopoly company of electric power supply in the Kansai
area of Japan. The KEPCO had been the leader company
of PWR introductions in Japan since the first commercial
operation of Mihama No.1 unit in November 1970. KEPCO
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Table 11. Guide on Development and Design of Computerized Human Interface of Main Control Room  
Subject Contents
1.Functional requirements
2.Design requirements
3.Development process
and fabrication design
process 
4.Verification and
validation process
1.1 Ensuring monitor and operation functions for every plant state
1.2 Selection of necessary equipments of monitor and operation functions to ensure safety functions
1.3 Ensuring time allowance of operators’ operation action
1.4 Reliability maintenance of information integration function by computer
1.5 Notify loss of its function
2.1 Information system (appropriate monitoring and operation system, information navigation)
2.2 Information presentation (layout, shape, integration, fit to operators’ habit, readability and visibility,
presentation format, hardware display)
2.3 Controllers and actuators (consistent layout, shape, grouping, selection and operation method fit to
operators’ habit, touch operation, basically no GO output by a single  operation, etc.)
2.4 Alarm system (alarm reduction, display of first hit alarm, alarm hierarchy by importance, operators’
reset function, etc.)
2.5 Large display (Visibility by all operators, automatic display change, control by operator, etc.)
2.6 Operation support system (Presentation of necessary support information and its explanation, etc.)
2.7 Work space (ergonomics design of layout, shape, illumination, etc.)
2.8 Selection of auxiliary equipments in the main control room
See Figure 9
4.1 Formation of evaluation team (operator, human interface designer, ergonomist)
4.2.1 Reduction of evaluation items
4.2.2 Setting evaluation criteria
4.2.3 Evaluation method (Desk-top evaluation by check list, Mock up,
Dynamic evaluation, Simulator experiment)
4.2.4 Selection of events to be evaluated
4.2.5 Feedback to the design specification and re-evaluation
4.2.6 Documentation
4. Procedure and contents of
verification & validation
Fig. 9. Development Process and Fabrication Design Process
of Computerized Human-machine Interface
has now eleven PWR units in three nuclear power stations
all located in the Wakasa Bay area. 
The application of digital computers in PWR plants
at KEPCO had been directed into three areas: (i)expansion
of plant automation, (ii)modernization of main control
room (MCR), and (iii)extended capability of data logging,
transmission and communication for plant management.
The author’s report [10] summarizes the first two issues
of (i) and (ii) at the time of 1994. 
According to Ref.[10] the expansion of plant automation
in PWRs by digital computers had started to replace the
analog control systems with digital computers from periph-
eral independent processes such as waste management
system to digitalization of various plant control systems
by using micro processors. Introduction of micro processor
based digital control systems for most of non-safety class
systems had been successfully realized in KEPCO’s Ohi
No. 3 Unit in 1991 and No.4 Unit in 1993. 
The application of micro-processors for safety-class
components (reactor protection systems and engineered
safety facilities) together with the full digital MCRs had
been extensively conducted for both APWR and ABWR
by the cooperation of all nuclear utility companies and
nuclear power plant vendors in Japan in the early 1990s.
From the preceding development stages of non safety class
micro processor based control system until the time of
safety class digital safety systems, the V and V technologies
for software reliability of micro processor based digital
control system in nuclear power plants had been established
in nuclear vendors by utilizing POL (problem oriented
language) with constant time step control by avoidance of
complicated multiple steps or nesting in programming.
The software tools by graphical interface for easy program-
ming and error checking had been also developed based
on POL. The development processes of full digital safety
systems and full digitalized MCRs are the same basis
technologies being established during the realization of full
digitalized I&C and HMIT for both ABWR and PWR in
Japan, and the experience and knowledge obtained through
the developments had been said to be documented as the
relevant industrial codes and guides by the JEA.
5.3.2 Proving Test of the Reliability of Nuclear I&C
The test of proving the reliability of nuclear I&C
systems for both BWR and PWR in Japan was conducted
between 1984 and 1989 by Nuclear Power Engineering
Test Center under the sponsorship of MITI [11]. The
targets equipments had been (i) preamplifiers and motor
modules of SRM and IRM of reactor neutron instrumen-
tation, (ii) pressurizer heater terminal, (iii)high range area
monitor, (iii) instrumentation rack, and (iv)software logic
controller. The conducted proving test was composed by
two kinds of test: (i) performance degradation by the
continuation of long time normal power operation (thermal
aging, radiation aging, vibrating aging and mechanical
aging), and (ii) performance endurance test under accident
conditions of temperature, steam, radiation and chemical
spray. The test results of this proving test were reflected
to the establishment of an industrial guide by the JEA in
Table 6: Guide on verifying anti-environmental perfor-
mance of Instrumentation and control systems of safety
functions(JEAG 4623-2008). Since this proving test had
been made under LOCA condition, it cannot be said that
the reactor instrumentation may endure the severe accident
condition as was occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi
accident. 
5.3.3 Comparison of APWR’s I&C Design with EPRI
URD
In Ref [10], it is interesting that the inter-comparison
was made between the design conditions of Japanese
APWR and those of EPRI’s URD for advanced light water
reactors [12]. Among many compared items, the following
items are interesting ones: (i)the MTBF (mean time
between failure) of total system was five years by EPRI
URD, while that was 100 years by Japanese APWR design,
(ii) MTBF of key system parts was 14 days by EPRI URD
while that by Japanese APWR, 1 months, (iii) MTTR
(mean time to repair) by EPRI URD was 4 hours average
with 8 hours maximum, while the target of MTTR was
30 minutes by Japanese APWR design, while (iv) there is
a great discrepancy on severe accident preparedness
between EPRI URD and Japanese APWR design. That is
to say, Japanese APWR design aims at higher reliability
for normal operation and maintenance, whereas it lacks
on the provision for nuclear severe accident. Concretely
speaking, there is no correspondence between EPRI URD
and Japanese APWR design as to the provision of Technical
Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operating Facility.
It is also notable that in Ref.[10] it pointed out the need
of introducing various I&C system for Japanese APWR
with respect to severe accident management.
6. IMPACT OF FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT TO
NUCLEAR I&C AND HMIT DESIGNING
Now it is a common understanding in Japan as the
main reason why four units of TEPCO‘s Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power station failed after the largest earthquake
followed by highest Tsunami in Japanese historical record.
Before Fukushima Daiichi accident, severe accident provi-
sion in nuclear power station had been left to utility’s
voluntary activity reviewed by national regulatory body
in Japan (both Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) and
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). TEPCO
could not prevent the core melt and hydrogen explosions
in four units one by one after the Tsunami hit the mainland.
After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, TEPCO almost
became bankrupt for various reasons related to the Fuku-
shima Daiichi accident, and both NSC and NISA were
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dissolved to form newly Nuclear Regulation Authority
(NRA) under the Ministry of Environment. Now the
NRA has been busy with reforming all laws and orders
concerned with nuclear regulation in Japan, where the
legislature reformation of severe accident prevention and
counter-measures are central issues to be revised until July
2013 [13], in order to cope with the restart application by
the electric power companies of all shutdown nuclear power
plants in Japan after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. 
This redirection of nuclear safety regulation also
requested that the I&C and HMIT designing should cope
with the level 4 in Table 2 of five defense levels of
nuclear safety from the former levels 2 and 3. Since the
direct cause of Fukushima Daiichi accident was largely
the earthquake and the ensuing tsunami, it was already
pointed out the necessities to take into account of the
following enforcement into the present nuclear I&C system:
(i) Addition of I&Cs to endure severe accident- Pressure,
water level, temperature sensors to endure severe accident
condition, and addition of filtered vent with enforced
communication channels, and (ii) Backup electric power
preparation for maintaining air condition, illumination,
and radiation filter in MCR. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A comprehensive review on the technical standards
on human factors (HF) design and software reliability
maintenance for digital instrumentation and control (I&C)
system with human-machine interface technology (HMIT)
in Japanese light water reactor nuclear power plants (NPPs)
was given in this paper mainly by introducing the relevant
activities at the Japan Electric Association to set up many
industrial standards within the traditional framework of
nuclear safety regulation in Japan. 
In Japan, the Fukushima Daiichi accident occurring on
March 11, 2011 had a great impact on nuclear regulation
and nuclear industries where concerns by the general public
about safety have heightened significantly. However for
the part of HF design and software reliability maintenance
of digital I&C and HMIT for NPP, the author believes that
the past practice of Japanese activities with the related
technical standards can be successfully inherited in the
future, by reinforcing the technical preparedness for the
prevention and mitigation against any types of severe
accident occurrence. 
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